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Body Area Network Device-to-device Authentication using Natural gAit

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- Jet lag
- Awesome sunrise
- Let's go jogging







Quantified self





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Putting on your wearables







Putting on all your wearables





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Putting on all your wearables







Device-to-Device Authentication

Bluetooth Authentication

- "Just works" profile
- Still pressing buttons
- DH key exchange
- No MitM protection





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- Person's gait (walking pattern)
- Zero interaction
- Independent of on-body location
- MitM protection







Novelty

Unlock smartphones

- Muaaz et al. 2015
- Hoang et al. 2015

Device2Device Authentication

- No init procedure with templates
- Fresh secrets for each D2D authentication

Gait Cycle





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Accelerometer Reading



Accelerometer reading on z-axis only







Rotated Signal



- Orientation relative to ground using Madgwick's Algorithm
 - Notice influence of gravity g







Noise-Reduced Signal



Apply a bandpass filter to keep frequencies between 0.5 and 12 Hz





Gait-Cycle Detection



- Partition data into gait cycles
- Resample gait cycles to equal length
- Calculate average gait cycle





Quantization



- Average gait cycle overlaid on each original gait cycle
- 4 bits per cycle



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Comparison between Locations





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Evaluation





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Conclusion

- Device-to-Device authentication for Body Area Networks
- Zero-interaction based on human gait pattern
- For 128 bit keys, 192 bit fingerprints are generated (48 cycles), disregarding 64 unreliable bits
- Worst-case duration: 96 s
- 80 % similarity required for fuzzy cryptography ⇒ 103-bit security level for the PAKE password.





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Any questions?

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Backup Slides



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Spectral Coherence



Figure: Average spectral coherence over full sensor readings of the Mannheim dataset for same and different subject.





Reliability



Total Fingerprint Size M

Figure: Fingerprint similarity of different sizes *M* with cutoff at N = 128 to evaluate the influence of *Rel*().





Fingerprint Similarity

Table: Fingerprint similarity between locations on the same body (intra-body). Shown is the mean over all 15 subjects.

	×.				arm		
	thest	forest	nead	shin	thigh	JPPETT	Walst
chest	1.0	0.82	0.74	0.78	0.78	0.88	0.81
forearm	0.82	1.0	0.8	0.81	0.88	0.89	0.89
head	0.74	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.76	0.77	0.78
shin	0.78	0.81	0.8	1.0	0.77	0.78	0.8
thigh	0.78	0.88	0.76	0.77	1.0	0.85	0.84
upperarm	0.88	0.89	0.77	0.78	0.85	1.0	0.88
waist	0.81	0.89	0.78	0.8	0.84	0.88	1.0





Entropy



Figure: Distribution of p-values achieved for 128 bit keys (fingerprint length M = 192, 64 unreliable bits removed) in 21 runs of the various statistical tests of the dieHarder set of statistical tests.



